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Stability is destabilizing. These three words concisely capture the insight that underlies 
Hyman Minsky’s analysis of the economy’s transformation over the entire postwar 
period. The basic thesis is that the dynamic forces of a capitalist economy are explosive 
and must be contained by institutional ceilings and floors. However, to the extent that 
these constraints achieve some semblance of stability, they will change behavior in such a 
way that the ceiling will be breached in an unsustainable speculative boom. If the 
inevitable crash is “cushioned” by the institutional floors, the risky behavior that caused 
the boom will be rewarded. Another boom will build, and the crash that follows will 
again test the safety net. Over time, the crises become increasingly frequent and severe, 
until finally “it” (a great depression with a debt deflation) becomes possible.  
Policy must adapt as the economy is transformed. The problem with the 
stabilizing institutions that were put in place in the early postwar period is that they no 
longer served the economy well by the 1980s. Further, they had been purposely degraded 
and even in some cases dismantled, often in the erroneous belief that “free” markets are 
self-regulating. Hence, the economy evolved over the postwar period in a manner that 
made it much more fragile. Minsky continually formulated and advocated policy to deal 
with these new developments. Unfortunately, his warnings were largely ignored by the 
profession and by policymakers—until it was too late.  
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Stability is destabilizing. Those three words capture in a concise manner the insight that 
underlies Minsky’s analysis of the transformation of the economy over the entire postwar 
period. The basic thesis is that the dynamic forces of the capitalist economy are explosive 
so that they must be contained by institutional ceilings and floors. However, to the extent 
that the constraints successfully achieve some semblance of stability, that will change 
behavior in such a manner that the ceiling will be breached in an unsustainable 
speculative euphoria. If the inevitable crash is cushioned by the institutional floors, the 
risky behavior that caused the boom will be rewarded. Another boom will build, and its 
crash will again test the safety net. Over time, the crises become increasingly frequent 
and severe until finally “it” (a great depression with a debt deflation) becomes possible. 
While Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis” is fundamentally pessimistic, it 
is not meant to be fatalistic (see Minsky 1975, 1982, 1986). Policy must adapt as the 
economy is transformed. The problem with the stabilizing institutions that had been put 
in place in the early postwar period is that they no longer served the economy well by the 
1980s. Further, they had been purposely degraded and even in some cases dismantled, 
often on the erroneous belief that “free” markets are self-regulating. Indeed, that became 
the clarion call of most of the economics profession after the early 1970s, based on the 
rise of “new” classical economics with its rational agents and instantaneously clearing 
markets and the “efficient markets hypothesis” that proclaimed prices fully reflect all 
information about “fundamentals.” Hence, not only had firms learned how to circumvent 
regulations and other constraints, but policymakers had removed regulations and 
substituted “self-regulation” in place of government oversight.  
From his earliest writings in the late 1950s to his final papers written before his 
death in 1996, Minsky always analyzed the financial innovations of profit-seeking firms 
that were designed to subvert New Deal constraints. For example, he was one of the first 
economists to recognize how the development of the fed funds market had already 
reduced the Fed’s ability to use reserves to constrain bank lending, while at the same time 
“stretching” liquidity because banks would have fewer safe and liquid assets should they 
need to unwind balance sheets (Minsky 1975). And much later, in a remarkably prescient  
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piece in 1987, Minsky had foreseen the development of securitization (to move interest 
rate risk off bank balance sheets while reducing capital requirements) that would later be 
behind the global financial crash of 2007 (Minsky 2008). At the same time, Minsky 
continually formulated and advocated policy to deal with these new developments. 
Unfortunately, his warnings were largely ignored by the profession and by 
policymakers—until it was too late. 
 
MINSKY’S THEORY OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
 
In the introduction I focused on long-term transformations because too often Minsky’s 
analysis is interpreted as a theory of the business cycle. There have even been some 
analyses that attempted to “prove” Minsky wrong by applying his theory to data from one 
business cycle. Further, the global crisis that began in 2007 has been called the “Minsky 
moment” or a “Minsky crisis.” As I will discuss, I agree that this crisis does fit with 
Minsky’s theory, but I object to analyses that begin with, say, 2004—attributing the 
causes of the crisis to changes that occurred over a handful of years that preceded the 
collapse. Rather, I argue that we should find the causes of the crisis in the transformation 
that began in 1951. We will not understand the crisis if we begin with a US real estate 
boom fueled by lending to subprime borrowers. That will be the topic of the next section. 
Now, Minsky did have a theory of the business cycle.
1 He called it “an investment 
theory of the cycle and a financial theory of investment.” He borrowed the first part of 
that from Keynes: investment is unstable and tends to be the driver of the cycle (through 
its multiplier impact). Minsky’s contribution was the financial theory of investment, with 
his John Maynard Keynes (1975) providing the detailed exposition. In brief, investment 
is financed with a combination of internal and external (borrowed) funds. Over an 
expansion, success generates a greater willingness to borrow, which commits a rising 
portion of expected gross profits (Minsky called it gross capital income) to servicing 
debt. This exposes the firm to greater risk because if income flows turn out to be less than 
expected, or if finance costs rise, firms might not be able to meet those debt payment 
commitments. There is nothing inevitable about that, however, because Minsky 
                                                 
1 See Papadimitriou and Wray (1998) for a summary of Minsky’s approach.  
4 
incorporated the profits equation of Michal Kalecki in his analysis: at the aggregate level 
total profits equal investment plus the government’s deficit plus net exports plus 
consumption out of profits and less saving out of wages (Minsky 1986). The important 
point is that all else equal, higher investment generates higher profits at the aggregate 
level. This can actually make the system even more unstable because if profits 
continually exceed expectations, making it easy to service debt, then firms will borrow 
even more.  
This then leads to Minsky’s famous categorization of financial positions: a hedge 
unit can meet payment commitments out of income flow; a speculative unit can only pay 
interest but must roll-over principal; and a Ponzi unit cannot even make the interest 
payments so must “capitalize” them (borrowing to pay interest). (Minsky borrowed the 
name of a famous fraudster, Charles Ponzi, who ran a “pyramid” scheme—in more recent 
times, Bernie Madoff ran another pyramid that failed spectacularly.) Over a “run of good 
times,” firms (and households) are encouraged to move from hedge to speculative 
finance, and the economy as a whole transitions from one in which hedge finance 
dominates to one with a greater weight of speculative finance. Eventually some important 
units find they cannot pay interest, driving them to Ponzi finance. Honest bankers do not 
like to lend to Ponzi units because their outstanding debt grows continually unless 
income flows eventually rise. When the bank stops lending, the Ponzi unit collapses. 
Following Irving Fisher, Minsky then described a “debt deflation” process: collapse by 
one borrower can bring down his creditors, who default on their own debts and 
generating a snowball of defaults. Uncertainty and pessimism rise, investment collapses, 
and, through the multiplier, income and consumption also fall, and we are on our way to 
a recession.  
But Minsky did not mean to imply that all financial crises lead to recessions nor 
that all recessions result from the transition to speculative and Ponzi finance. The Federal 
government in the postwar period was big—20% to 25% of the economy versus only 3% 
on the verge of the Great Depression. This meant that government itself could be both 
stabilizing and destabilizing. Countercyclical movement of its budget from surplus in a 
boom to deficit in a slump would stabilize income and profits (recall from above that 
deficits add to profits). A rising deficit could potentially offset the effects of falling  
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investment, and, indeed, over the postwar period that helped to cushion every recession. 
However, it is also possible for the government to cause a downturn—as it did in the 
demobilization from WWII. And if the budget is excessively biased toward surplus when 
the economy grows, it will generate “fiscal drag”—that removes household income and 
profits of firms—causing a recession. For that reason, a recession could occur well before 
the private sector is dominated by speculative and Ponzi positions. (Note that an economy 
that moves toward current account deficits when it grows robustly—such as the United 
States—will suffer an additional “headwind” that sucks income and profits from 
domestic households and firms.) 
In addition to the “big government,” the postwar period also had what Minsky 
called the “big bank”—the Fed. The Fed plays a number of roles: it sets interest rates, it 
regulates and supervises banks, and it acts as lender of last resort. Generally, it moves 
interest rates in a procyclical manner (raising them in expansion and lowering them in 
recession), which is believed to be stabilizing. For Minsky, interest rate policy would not 
be a strong stabilizing force: raising rates in a boom would increase finance costs and 
hasten the transition to speculative and Ponzi financial positions; lowering rates in a 
collapse would do little to encourage borrowing and spending if expectations were 
devastated. And, unfortunately, most Fed policy over the postwar period involved 
reducing regulation and supervision, promoting the natural transition to financial 
fragility. But lender of last resort policy was viewed by Minsky as essential—it would 
stop a bank run and would help to put a floor to asset prices, attenuating the debt 
deflation process discussed above. If the Fed lends to a troubled financial institution, it 
does not have to sell assets to try to cover demands by creditors for redemption. For 
example, if depositors are demanding cash withdrawal, in the absence of a lender of last 
resort the bank would have to sell assets to raise the cash required; this is normally 
difficult for assets such as loans, and nearly impossible to do in a crisis. So the Fed lends 
the reserves to cover withdrawals. 
In sum, the combination of the big bank and the big government helps to prevent 
a financial crisis from turning into a deep downturn. The big government’s deficit puts a 
floor to falling income and profits, and the big bank’s lending relieves pressure in 
financial markets (Minsky 1986). A financial crisis can even occur without setting off a  
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recession—a good example was the 1987 stock market crash, in which the Fed quickly 
intervened with the promise that it would lend reserves to market participants to stop 
necessitous selling of stocks to cover positions. No recession followed the crash—unlike 
the October 1929 crash, in which margin calls forced sales of stocks. And the big 
government deficits kept profits flowing in 1987, again unlike 1929 when the 
government’s budget was far too small to make up for collapsing investment.  
 
MONEY MANAGER CAPITALISM AND THE CRISIS 
 
Beginning in 2007, the world faced the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. References 
to Keynesian theory and policy became commonplace, with only truly committed free 
marketeers arguing against massive government spending to cushion the collapse and re-
regulation to prevent future crises. All sorts of explanations were proffered for the causes 
of the crisis: lax regulation and oversight, rising inequality that encouraged households to 
borrow to support spending, greed and irrational exuberance, and excessive global 
liquidity—spurred by easy money policy in the United States and by US current account 
deficits that flooded the world with too many dollars. Unfortunately, these do not fully 
recognize the systemic nature of the global crisis. 
  Minsky’s work also enjoyed unprecedented interest, with many calling this the 
“Minsky Moment” or “Minsky Crisis” (Cassidy 2008; Chancellor 2007; McCulley 2007; 
Whalen 2007). I argued above that we should not view this as a “moment” that can be 
traced to recent developments. Rather, as Minsky had been arguing for nearly fifty years, 
what we have seen is a slow transformation of the global financial system toward what 
Minsky called “money manager capitalism” that finally collapsed in 2007. Hence, I call it 
the “Minsky half-century” (Wray 2009). 
It is essential to recognize that we have had a long series of crises, and the trend 
has been toward more severe and more frequent crises: muni bonds in the mid-1960s; real 
estate investment trusts in the early 1970s; developing-country debt in the early 1980s; 
commercial real estate, junk bonds, and the thrift crisis in the United States (with banking 
crises in many other nations) in the 1980s; stock market crashes in 1987 and again in 
2000 with the dot-com bust; the Japanese meltdown from the early 1980s; Long Term  
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Capital Management, the Russian default, and Asian debt crises in the late 1990s; and so 
on. Until the current crisis, each of these was resolved (some more painfully than 
others—impacts were particularly severe and long-lasting in the developing world) with 
some combination of central bank or international institution (IMF, World Bank) 
intervention plus a fiscal rescue (often taking the form of US Treasury spending of last 
resort to prop up the US economy to maintain imports that helped to generate rest of 
world growth). 
The problem is money manager capitalism—the economic system characterized 
by highly leveraged funds seeking maximum returns in an environment that 
systematically underprices risk (Wray 2009). With little regulation or supervision of 
financial institutions, money managers concocted increasingly esoteric and opaque 
financial instruments that quickly spread around the world. Contrary to economic theory, 
markets generate perverse incentives for excess risk, punishing the timid with low 
returns. Those playing along are rewarded with high returns because highly leveraged 
funding drives up prices for the underlying assets—whether they are dot-com stocks, Las 
Vegas homes, or corn futures.  
Many have accurately described the phenomenon as “financialization”—growing 
debt that leverages income flows and wealth. At the 2007 peak, total debt in the United 
States reached a record five times GDP (versus three times GDP in 1929), with most of 
that private debt of households and firms. From 1996 until 2007 the US private sector 
spent more than its income (running deficits that increased debt) every year except during 
the recession that followed the dot-com bust in 2000. Financial institution debt also grew 
spectacularly over the past two decades, totaling more than GDP. Exotic financial 
instruments like credit default swaps (bets on failure of assets, firms, and even 
governments) exploded—total financial derivatives (including credit default swaps, 
interest rate swaps, and exchange rate swaps) reached perhaps $600 trillion—many times 
world GDP.  
Many accounts blame subprime mortgages (home loans made to riskier 
borrowers, typically low-income households) for the global financial collapse—but that 
is obviously much too simple. The total value of riskier mortgage loans made in the 
United States during the real estate boom could not have totaled more than a trillion or  
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two dollars (big numbers, but exceedingly small relative to the hundreds of trillions of 
dollars of financial instruments). The United States was not the only country that 
experienced a speculative boom in real estate—Ireland, Spain, and some countries in 
eastern Europe also had them. Then there was also speculation in commodities markets—
that led to the biggest boom in history, followed by the inevitable crash—that involved 
about a half trillion dollars of managed money (mostly US pension funds) placing bets in 
commodities futures markets (Wray 2008). Global stock markets also enjoyed a renewed 
speculative hysteria. Big banks like Goldman Sachs speculated against US state 
governments as well as countries like Greece. And on top of all this speculative fervor 
there was also fraud—which appears to have become normal business practice in all of 
the big financial institutions. It will be years, perhaps decades, before we will unravel all 
of the contributing factors, including the financial instruments and practices as well as the 
criminal activities by market players and government officials, that led to the collapse. 
This much we do know: the entire financial system had evolved in a manner that 
made “it”—an economic collapse and debt deflation—possible. Riskier practices had 
been permitted by regulators, and encouraged by rewards and incentives. Lack of 
oversight and prosecution let fraud take over most big institutions. The combination of 
big government and big bank interventions plus bail-outs of “too big to fail” institutions 
let risk grow on trend. The absence of depressions allowed financial wealth to grow over 
the entire postwar period—including personal savings and pension funds. All of these 
funds needed to earn returns. As a result, the financial sector grew relative to GDP—as a 
percent of value-added, it grew from 10% to 20%, and its share of corporate profits 
quadrupled from about 10% to 40% from 1960 to 2007 (Nersisyan and Wray 2010). It 
simply became too large relative to the size of the economy’s production and income. 
The crash was the market’s attempt to downsize finance—just as the crash in 1929 
permanently reduced the role played by finance, and allowed for the robust growth of the 
postwar period.  
It is important to include as contributing factors the destruction of New Deal 
institutions that had enhanced economic stability, including most importantly the creation 
of a high-consumption, high-employment, and high-wage society. As Minsky (1986, 
1996) argued, we emerged from WWII with powerful labor unions that were able to  
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obtain good and growing wages, which fueled growth of domestic consumption out of 
income. Debt loads were extremely low in the private sector—with debts having been 
wiped out in the Great Depression—and with lots of safe government bonds held as 
assets. In combination with a strengthened government safety net (Social Security for the 
aged, welfare and unemployment compensation for those without jobs, the GI bill for 
soldiers returning home, low interest rate loans for students) this meant that consumption 
comprised a large part of GDP. For Minsky, consumption out of income is a very stable 
component—unlike investment that is unstable. Minsky argued that investment-led 
growth is more unstable than growth led by a combination of consumption out of income 
plus government spending because the second model does not lead to worsening private 
sector balance sheets.  
However, over the course of the past four decades, union power declined; Minsky 
frequently claimed that the most significant action taken during the Reagan 
administration was the busting of the air traffic controller’s union (which sent a message 
to all of labor), median real wages stopped growing, consumer debt grew on trend (and 
then exploded after 1995), and the generosity of the safety net was reduced. Further, over 
the whole period, policy consistently favored investment and saving over consumption—
with favorable tax treatment of savings and investment, and with public subsidies of 
business investment. Federal government also stopped growing (relative to the size of the 
economy) and its spending shifted away from public infrastructure investment. Inequality 
grew on trend, so that it actually surpassed the 1929 record inequality. President Bush 
even celebrated the creation of the “ownership society”—ironically, with concentration 
of ownership of financial assets at the very top (Wray 2005). The only asset that was 
widely owned was the home, which then became the basis for a speculative bubble that 
would generate widespread foreclosures—with families kicked out of their homes, owing 
lots of debt, and with real estate prices collapsing so that vulture hedge funds could buy 
up blocks of houses at pennies on the dollar. Effectively, that is the culmination of the 
ownership society.  
We are now living with the aftermath as positions are delevered, driving prices of 
the underlying collateral (homes, commodities, factories) down. Previous financial crises 
were sufficiently limited that only a portion of the managed money was wiped out so that  
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a new boom inevitably rose from the ashes. However, this current crisis is probably so 
severe that it will not only destroy a considerable part of the managed money, but it has 
already thoroughly discredited the money managers. And, in spite of the unprecedented 
efforts of Fed Chairman Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Geithner to save the money 
managers, I believe they ultimately will fail to restore “business as usual.” 
Perhaps this will prove to be the end of this stage of capitalism—the money 
manager phase. Of course, it is too early to even speculate on the form capitalism will 
take in the future. In the final section I will look at the policy response that will help to 
reformulate global capitalism along Minskyan lines.  
 
MINSKYAN POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLLAPSE OF MONEY 
MANAGER CAPITALISM 
 
Minsky (1986) argued that the Great Depression represented a failure of the small-
government/laissez-faire economic model, while the New Deal promoted a big 
government/big bank highly successful model for financial capitalism. The current crisis 
just as convincingly represents a failure of the big government/neoconservative (or, 
outside the United States, what is called neoliberal) model that promotes deregulation, 
reduced supervision and oversight, privatization, and consolidation of market power. It 
replaced the New Deal reforms with self-supervision of markets, with greater reliance on 
“personal responsibility” as safety nets were shredded, and with monetary and fiscal 
policy that is biased against maintenance of full employment and adequate growth to 
generate rising living standards for most Americans. Even before the crisis, the United 
States faced record inequality and destruction of the middle class, a healthcare crisis, an 
incarceration disaster, and other problems beyond the scope of this article (see Wray 
2000, 2005). 
We must return to a more sensible model, with enhanced oversight of financial 
institutions and with a financial structure that promotes stability rather than speculation. 
We need policy that promotes rising wages for the bottom half so that borrowing is less 
necessary to achieve middle-class living standards. We need policy that promotes 
employment, rather than transfer payments—or worse, incarceration—for those left  
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behind. Monetary policy must be turned away from using rate hikes to preempt inflation 
and toward a proper role: stabilizing interest rates, direct credit controls to prevent 
runaway speculation, and supervision.  
Minsky insisted “the creation of new economic institutions which constrain the 
impact of uncertainty is necessary,” arguing that the “aim of policy is to assure that the 
economic prerequisites for sustaining the civil and civilized standards of an open liberal 
society exist. If amplified uncertainty and extremes in income maldistribution and social 
inequalities attenuate the economic underpinnings of democracy, then the market 
behavior that creates these conditions has to be constrained” (Minsky 1996: 14–15). It is 
time to take finance back from the clutches of Wall Street’s casino. 
Minsky had long called for an “employer of last resort” program to provide jobs 
to those unable to find them in the private sector. In a sense this would be a counterpart to 
the central bank’s “lender of last resort” program. In the jobs program, government 
would offer a perfectly elastic supply of jobs at a basic program wage. Anyone willing to 
work at that wage would be guaranteed a job. Workers would be “taken as they are”—
whatever their level of education or training—and jobs would be designed for their skill 
level. Training would be a part of every job—to improve skills and to make workers 
more employable outside the program. The work would provide useful services and 
public infrastructure, improving living standards. While Minsky is best known for his 
work on financial instability, his proposal for the employer of last resort program 
received almost as much of his attention, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Interested 
readers are referred to the growing body of work on use of job guarantee programs as part 
of long-term development strategy (Bhaduri 2005; Felipe, Mitchell, and Wray 2009; 
Hirway 2006; Minsky 1965; Mitchell and Wray 2005; Tcherneva and Wray 2007; Wray 
2007). Note that this would help to achieve Minsky’s goal of a high-employment 
economy with decent wages to finance consumption. Minsky always saw the job 
guarantee as a stabilizing force—and not something that is desirable for purely 
humanitarian reasons. 
The global crisis offers both grave risks as well as opportunities. Global 
employment and output collapsed faster than at any time since the Great Depression. 
Hunger and violence are growing—even in developed nations. The 1930s offer examples  
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of possible responses—on the one hand, nationalism and repression (Nazi Germany), on 
the other a New Deal and progressive policy. There is no question that finance has played 
an outsized role over the past two decades, both in the developed nations where policy 
promoted managed money and in the developing nations which were encouraged to open 
to international capital. Households and firms in developed nations were buried under 
mountains of debt even as incomes for wage earners stagnated. Developing nations were 
similarly swamped with external debt service commitments, while the promised benefits 
of neoliberal policies usually never arrived.  
It is time to finally put global finance back in its proper place as a tool to 
achieving sustainable development, much as we did in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression. This means substantial downsizing and careful re-regulation. Government 
must play a bigger role, which in turn requires a new economic paradigm that recognizes 
the possibility of simultaneously achieving social justice, full employment, and price and 
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